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Design Staking Mechanism for Blockchain Consensus and Governance: A Comparative Study of Ethereum 2.0, Algorand, and Internet Computer

Staking Mechanism Design: Ethereum for Social Good

Published onMar 05, 2023
Design Staking Mechanism for Blockchain Consensus and Governance: A Comparative Study of Ethereum 2.0, Algorand, and Internet Computer
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Figure 1: Design Staking Mechanism for Blockchain Consensus and Governance: A Comparative Study of Ethereum 2.0, Algorand, and Internet Computer

Part I Introduction

Chainlink (2023) defines staking as “the locking up of cryptocurrency tokens as collateral to help secure a network or smart contract, or to achieve a specific result.” Among all the blockchain applications of the staking mechanism, the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) mechanism is nearly the most famous one. By Sept. 15th, 2022, Ethereum blockchains have switched its consensus mechanism to the PoS system with the Ethereum 2.0 update. The PoS mechanism, in which validators stake ethers (ETH) into a smart contract to participate in transaction verification and block-building process, has supported the Ethereum ecosystem for several months and taken effect in energy-saving and security. In this article, we review the application of the staking mechanisms, especially on the widely used Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanism, including the Ethereum blockchain, and alternatives that apply PoS to construct their consensus protocols and secure blockchain systems. Furthermore, we conduct a comparative study to analyze the application of staking mechanisms on Ethereum 2.0, Algorand, and Internet Computer blockchain. In comparison, we extend the understanding of staking mechanism applications from blockchain consensus to on-chain governance. We also provide a taxonomy for comparing staking mechanism designs in participation conditions and incentives, the liquidity of staked assets, and exit conditions. Our exploratory research pays the way for designing future staking mechanisms for various applications and on-chain activities to achieve desired outcomes. 

Part II The Proof-of-Stake Mechanism

2.1 A Sketch of Consensus Mechanisms

Consensus mechanisms are stacks of designs to solve the consensus problems in blockchain systems by facilitating agents to agree on blockchain states and improve reliability between nodes in the network. The designs of consensus mechanisms comprise protocols, incentives, on-chain policies, and other ideas, which have benefited many aspects of blockchain technologies (i.e., incentives designed for the consensus layer (Wang et al. 2019), and protocol designs for network, data, and infrastructure layers (Xiao et al. 2020, Zhang and Lee 2020), etc.) and applications (i.e., cryptocurrencies, decentralized finance (Wang et al. 2019), etc.). We concluded the application of consensus mechanisms on different blockchain layers with some examples in Figure 2.

Figure 2: The applications of consensus mechanisms on different blockchain layers.

Soon after implementing Proof-of-Work (PoW) on Bitcoin (Nakamoto 2008), the very first consensus-based cryptocurrency, and the proposed Byzantine Generals Problem (Lamport, Shostak, and Pease 1982), which has become the most famous consensus problem, more consensus mechanisms were invented and applied to support the creation and security of blockchains. Including the mentioned PoW that Bitcoin uses, among the most famous consensus mechanisms are the PoS of Ethereum (Wackerow 2022, Ethereum Developers 2022) and Peercoin (King and Nadal 2012), the Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) of BitShares (bitshares 2018), the Pure-PoS of Algorand (Algorand, n.d.), and the Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) of Tendermint (Kwon 2014), which all belong to the Byzantine consensus (Gramoli 2020). We show the mapping between major consensus algorithms and their blockchain use cases in Figure 3. Other consensus algorithms designed by scholars and practitioners include Proof-of-Importance (PoI) (Li, Li, et al. 2017), Proof-of-Activity (PoA) (Bentov et al. 2014), Stellar Consensus Protocol (Mazières n.d.), and CloudPoS (Tosh et al. 2018).

Figure 3: The application of consensus mechanisms on blockchains or cryptocurrencies.

2.2. The Evaluation Features for Consensus Mechanisms.

An emerging literature proposes taxonomies to compare the performance of blockchain consensus algorithms in 4 facets of energy-saving (Zheng et al. 2017, Bach, Mihaljevic, and Zagar 2018), fault tolerance ratio (Mingxiao et al. 2017, Zheng et al. 2017, Bach, Mihaljevic, and Zagar 2018, Chaudhry and Yousaf 2018), scalability (Mingxiao et al. 2017, Chaudhry and Yousaf 2018), and adaptable blockchain type (Chaudhry and Yousaf 2018). Table 1 represents the comparative study of the six major consensus algorithms in the four facets. 

Design Feature

PoW

PoS

DPoS

Pure-PoS

PBFT

DBFT

Energy Saving

No

Partial

Partial

Partial

Yes

Yes

Fault Tolerance Ratio (Security)

< 51% computing power

< 51% computing power

< 51% computing power

< 51% computing power

< ⅓ faulty replicas

< ⅓ faulty replicas

Scalability

Strong

Strong

Strong

Strong

Weak

Weak

Adaptable Blockchain Type

Permissionless

Permissionless

Permissionless

Permissionless

Permissioned

Permissioned

Table 1: The evaluation of famous consensus mechanisms.

As blockchain technology evolves rapidly, the design of consensus algorithms has been facing new challenges and calling for innovative solutions. For example, as blockchains evolve from permissioned to permissionless settings, Pass and Shi (2016, 2017) first proposed a hybrid consensus protocol design model and then rethought and analyzed the difficulties of reaching the consensus in a permissionless blockchain compared with the permissioned settings. After several years, Chan and Shi (2020) looked back to the original permissioned blockchains. They described a paradigm, Streamlet, for constructing consensus protocols on permissioned blockchains, which they proposed to “decipher the past five years of work on consensus partly driven by the cryptocurrency community.”

2.3. Consensus protocols based on the Staking Mechanism.

The Proof-of-Stake consensus mechanism, or PoS, was originally invented to ameliorate the energy waste problem in the PoW mechanism (Saleh 2018). In contrast to the PoW mechanism which determines the block proposer by computing power, the PoS mechanism makes all the miners stake a certain amount of tokens to become validators, uses different lead election mechanisms to select the block proposer, and makes the rest of the validators to validate the proposed block, and incentivizes consensus achievement by designing block rewards. The PoS mechanism has inspired a lot of consensus protocol designs, blockchain attack and security studies, and other feature analyses in crypto-economics (Nguyen et al. 2019).

After the Merge, Ethereum 2.0 has been using a staking mechanism to achieve consensus on its blockchain systems. Among the stack of designs based on the staking mechanism, the consensus protocols, which facilitate the operation of the distributed infrastructure, P2P network, and data storage, play an essential role in blockchains. Therefore, we summarize the representative consensus protocols designed based on the Proof-of-Stake consensus in Table 2. Casper, the consensus protocol run by Ethereum 2.0, combines Casper FFG proof-of-stake (Buterin and Griffith 2019) with the GHOST fork-choice rule (Buterin et al. 2020). 

Consensus Protocol

Application

Reference

Casper, A combination of Casper FFG proof-of-stake with the GHOST fork-choice rule

Ethereum Blockchains

Buterin and Griffith 2019

Buterin et al. 2020

Ouroboros

Cardano Blockchains

Cardano, n.d.

Other variants: 

“Ouroboros Genesis” (Badertscher et al. 2018), “Ouroboros Praos” (David et al. 2018)

Algorand

Algorand Blockchains

Algorand, n.d.

Tendermint (BFT-PoS)

Cosmos Blockchain

Cosmos n.d.

Table 2: The applications of consensus protocols based on the PoS mechanisms.

2.4. Security Issues on PoS Mechanisms

The security of PoS mechanisms has long been a trending issue of interest. PoS is often considered less secure than PoW because it eliminates how PoW is secured by hashing power, although both face 51% attack. The PoS blockchain faces even more attacks (Gaži, Kiayias, and Russell 2018, Sayeed and Marco-Gisbert 2019). According to the existing literature, scholars have discussed numerous approaches to secure PoS blockchains, including incentive designs, protocol designs, and algorithm designs to prevent potential attacks on blockchains. Table 3 lists some typical works that contributed significantly to PoS security studies.

Design

References

Approach

Consensus Protocol

Bentov, Pass, and Shi 2016, Daian, Pass, and Shi 2019

Designed a consensus protocol called “Snow White” to secure PoS blockchain 

Consensus Protocol

Tas et al. 2022

Designed a consensus protocol called “Babylon”, which bridges Bitcoin to a PoS chain to enhance security and trust.

Consensus Protocol

Fan and Zhou 2017

Investigated greedy strategies for PoS-based protocols which enabled the mimic of Bitcoin’s design via the PoS mechanism.

Consensus Protocol

Li, Wei, and He 2020

Designed a consensus protocol called “Robust Proof of Stake”, which avoids coin age accumulation attacks and Nothing-at-Stake (N@S) attacks.

Consensus Protocol

Li, Andreina, et al. 2017

Proposed two PoS variant consensus protocols to secure blockchain against the nothing at stake and the long-range attacks

Consensus algorithm

Akbar et al. 2021

Proposed a hybrid algorithm that combined the PoW and PoS mechanisms to prevent potential double-mining.

Incentives

Kang et al. 2019

Formulated a Stackelberg game and incentivized 

Table 3. The existing designs to secure PoS blockchains.

Part II A Comparative Study: The Application of the Staking Mechanisms on Ethereum, Algorand, and Internet Computer blockchains.

Most blockchains use the staking mechanism to identify, guide, and incentivize participants for on-chain operations. Ethereum names the participants who meet a specific staking requirement of the entrance as validators. In contrast, participants in Ethereum are validators of Algorand. With the staked assets, validators could participate in different blockchain activities like transaction validation, block-building, and on-chain governance, according to the specific policies. We summarize the application of the staking mechanism in the PoS Ethereum blockchains, Algorand blockchains, and Internet Computer blockchains and comparatively study their technology policy parameters related to the staking mechanisms in Table 3.

3.1. Staking-based Blockchain Activities: Block-building and on-chain governance

Staking mechanisms are to qualify participants for on-chain activities. Although staking-based activities depend on the token economy of different blockchain systems, two major activities that involve the staking mechanism are block-building and on-chain governance. In the block-building process, a validator who has staked a required amount of tokens are able to validate new blocks and verify transactions. Both the Ethereum and Algorand blockchains use the staking mechanism in their block-building process. In contrast, Internet Computer are run by big data centers with credits other than the staking mechanism in the block-building process. 

On-chain governance is a system that enables cryptocurrency blockchains to update themselves via rules encoded in the protocol for proposing, voting, and enacting new policies by participants (Kiayias and Lazos 2022). Both Algorand and Internet Computer blockchains use the staking mechanism in their on-chain governance. Algorand holds quarterly (Jan, April, July, and September) periods for stakeholders to sign in and take part as a governor staking ALGOs in the Algorand Community Governance (“Governance | Algorand Foundation” n.d.)); Similarly, Internet Computer runs an on-chain liquid governance (Ramos 2015) system, the Neural Network System (NNS), that receives real-time governance proposals and votes on proposals based on the staked Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) tokens coined as neurons (“A Detailed Guide to Voting on Proposals and Earning Rewards through the NNS” 2022). 

3.2. The Taxonomy of Staking Mechanism Design

Table 3 also represents a taxonomy of staking mechanism design in participation conditions and incentives, liquidity of staked assets, and exit conditions. To participate in block-building, participants usually have to stake the minimum required amount of tokens and run a blockchain node or use another third-party staking service. And the general incentives to participate include the non-monetary benefit of voting power in blockchain activities. Participants can enjoy the liquidity of staked assets by default or using a liquid staking service. Finally, participants can volunteer to exit from staking mechanisms following specified rules, which may relate to participation incentives or voting power. However, the participation condition and incentives differ across blockchains of various on-chain activities. Below, we compare the specifications of Ethereum, Algorand, and Internet Computer.

Ethereum: According to Johns Gresham’s presentation on Devcon Bogota (Gresham 2022), running an Ethereum node requires a computer with 8-16GB RAM, and 2TB fast SSD storage (currently, all the data on the PoS Ethereum requires 1TB, but the size grows to 10GB per week), and a modern CPU less than five years old (it may require less in the reality as we tested before), and an internet condition with at least 10MB for uploads and downloads, unlimited data, and no slow cellular or WiFi connections. Moreover, One who participates in the PoS Ethereum consensus protocol should stake 32 ETH to become an on-chain validator. In contrast to solo staking, participants can also take part in the staking mechanism without running a full node by choosing staking as a service (SaaS) or staking less than 32 ETH by joining a staking pool. However, both staking as a service (SaaS) and pool-staking have both additional monetary costs and security risks in the delegation of staking to a third party (“Ethereum Staking,” n.d.). In the block-building process, validators vote for the validation of blocks and receive block rewards if they attest correctly. Based on the staking mechanism, Ethereum also uses the slashing mechanism to punish malicious attestations on the blockchain. When malicious attestations happen, the corresponding validators would be slashed accordingly. A heavy slashing may lead directly to insufficient balance in one’s account and push the validator to be exited from its life cycle.

Algorand: For participants who run an Algorand node, according to the developer guideline on Algorand’s official website (Algorand n.d.), there are six node types to choose from to satisfy different on-chain activities, and participants in Algorand consensus protocols should run a non-relay non-archival participation node. The minimum hardware requirements are 4GB of RAM (8GB highly recommended) and a not-too-slow SSD for a computer, and a 100Mbps connection (1Gbps recommended) for the internet. Moreover, the voting power of staked AlGOs is in proportion to the weights of users in a system. Slightly different from other cryptocurrencies that use PoS consensus that expels malicious players, Algorand uses the weights assigned by staking to ensure that an attacker cannot amplify its power and guarantee blockchain security as long as no one holds more than ⅓ of total power. Algorand also uses the staking mechanism in its governance periods. Stakeholders sign in to the governance system and commit ALGOs to become a governor to participate in its community governance. While one committed ALGO represents one vote, the governors must maintain their committed Algo balance throughout each entire 3-month period. When a voting session comes, the governance portal will give all the voting measures, and governors make ZERO-ALGO transactions to vote. Interestingly, Algorand declares it does not participate directly in the voting (Algorand n.d.). Instead, Algorand would give out its favorite choice in the governance portal, and any governor could choose between yes (or choice A), no (or choice B), and vote with the Foundation.

Internet Computer: Unlike the PoS Ethereum and Algorand blockchains, Internet Computer, the only permissioned blockchain among these three, uses the staking mechanism in its on-chain governance to support decentralization and secure its protocol. Correspondingly, people are not required to run a node to take part—one who wishes to take part in the on-chain governance is only required to stake some ICP utility tokens for a required period between six months (the minimum) to eight years (the maximum) to become a governor in the on-chain governance. The staked assets would generate a neuron with a unique neuron ID as the governor’s identifier in the on-chain governance. The incentives are relatively simple—as the on-chain governance comprises three processes of proposing, voting, and enacting, the validators could gain more voting power in proportion to the staking amount and period. But unlike Algorand, Internet Computer takes part in the voting session directly with a large percentage of the voting power.

PoS Ethereum

Algorand

Internet Computer

Staking-based Blockchain Activities

1. Block-building

1. Block-building

1. On-chain Governance: 

Neural Network System (NNS)

2. On-chain Governance: Community Governance


Dashboards

Block-building

https://beaconcha.in/

https://algoexplorer.io/

https://dashboard.internetcomputer.org/

Governance

https://eips.ethereum.org/

https://algoexplorer.io/governance

https://dashboard.internetcomputer.org/governance

Consensus Protocol

Casper: Proof-of-Stake

Algorand: Pure Proof-of-Stake

Internet Computer Consensus (ICC)

Governance Mechanism

Off-chain governance: Ethereum Improvement Proposal

On-chain governing with staking mechanisms

On-chain governance with staking mechanisms



Participation Condition in staking mechanisms 

General Criteria

Run an Ethereum node and stake 32 ETHs to become a validator

1. For block-building: Run an Algorand node and stake required Algos.

2. For community governance: Stake at least 1 ALGO.

Anyone who staked some ICP utility tokens for a required period of time for a Neuron can take part. 

Participant Identifier

Validator Index

Participation Key

Neuron ID

Hardware Minimum Requirement for access in staking directly 

Computer: 8-16GB RAM, 2TB fast SSD storage, modern CPU, less than 5 years old; 

Internet: 10Mb, unlimited data, no slow cellular or wifi connection.

https://geth.ethereum.org/docs/getting-started/hardware-requirements

Computer: 4GB RAM, a not-too-slow SSD;

Internet: at least 100Mbps connection

Any computer that can access a webpage  

Specified means to participate 

1. Solo Staking 

2. Pooled Staking

3. Staking as a Service (SaaS)

Run a non-relay and non-archival participation node for participation in consensus protocol

Sign-in https://nns.ic0.app/ using Internet Computer Decentralized Identity. 

Liquidity of the staked assets

block-building

Not liquid ‌generally unless using liquid staking service such as Lido.

https://defillama.com/protocols/liquid%20staking/Ethereum


https://www.alchemy.com/list-of/liquid-staking-platforms-on-ethereum


https://www.coingecko.com/en/categories/liquid-staking-governance-tokens



Yes, in contrast to Bounded Proof-of-Stake (BPoS), PPoS does not require users to set aside part of their stake in order to participate in the consensus protocol, and participating in the consensus protocol does not reduce a user’s ability to spend their stake. In Algorand, users are free to spend their stake at any time. No stake is ever held hostage. All stake is always where it should be—in users’ wallets ready to be spent or in the various financial instruments that the Algorand blockchain underlies.

N/A

On-chain governance

N/A

Yes, by using the Algo Liquid Governance system to enjoy liquid govenance. 

https://folksfinance.medium.com/algo-liquid-governance-2-0-2911baba9269

Not liquid unless using liquid staking service such as via liquid ICP tokens


https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/liquid-icp/

Incentives for decision-making

1. Monetary Rewards

2. Non-monetary benefits: Voting power in validating blockchain data

3. Slashing/Minor Punishments

  1. Monetary Rewards

  2. Non-monetary benefits: Voting power in proportion to staked ALGO values 

  1. Monetary Rewards

  2. Non-monetary benefits: Voting power in proportion to Neurons of staked account and periods

Exit conditions

1. Volunteer to exit subject to specific rules

2. Insufficient balance

  1. Volunteer to exist subject to specific rules

  1. Volunteer to exit subject to specific rules


Documentations and References

Consensus or/and Staking in Block-building

https://ethereum.org/en/staking/

https://developer.algorand.org/docs/get-details/algorand_consensus/


https://www.algorand.com/technology/pure-proof-of-stake/

https://internetcomputer.org/how-it-works/consensus/


​​https://internetcomputer.org/docs/current/concepts/data-centers

Staking in on-chain governance

N/A

https://docs.algofi.org/algofi/algofi-vault/algorand-governance


https://www.algorand.foundation/governance


https://www.algorand.foundation/general-faq


https://www.algorand.com/resources/blog/decentralizing-algorand-governance-nov2020


https://www.algorandstats.com/


https://internetcomputer.org/docs/current/tokenomics/token-holders/nns-app-quickstart/


https://internetcomputer.org/docs/current/tokenomics/nns/nns-intro


https://wiki.internetcomputer.org/wiki/Network_Nervous_System

https://wiki.internetcomputer.org/wiki/Internet_Computer_wiki#For_Node_Providers



https://www.dfinitycommunity.com/a-detailed-guide-to-voting-on-proposals-and-earning-substantial-rewards-through-the-nns/


https://www.dfinitycommunity.com/neurons-promoting-true-decentralized-governance-in-the-network-nervous-system/

Table 3: The application of the staking mechanism on PoS Ethereum, Algorand, and Internet Computer: a comparative study.

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